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Abstract 
Supporters of the nuclear non-proliferation regime seek to reduce the threat of nuclear 
weapons faced by the international community. Although there is vast support for the elimination 
of nuclear weapons, governments struggle to find common ground and promote progress. 
Member countries of the European Union in particular, who supposedly share one Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), fail to reach a consensus on the Treaty on the Prohibition of 
Nuclear Weapons. This paper seeks to explain what has caused member countries of the 
European Union (EU), which claim to speak with one collective voice, to deviate from the 
apparent status quo. 
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Introduction 
Key Concepts 
There are several key concepts in this research project. Proliferation is the spread of 
nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons technology, materials, and information that could help a state 
develop nuclear weapons.  As defined by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 1
Weapons (NPT), a Nuclear Weapons State (NWS) is “one which has manufactured and exploded 
a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967”.  A Non-Nuclear 2
Weapons State (NNWS) is a state that has not detonated, developed, or acquired nuclear 
weapons. A nuclear host state is a state that does not possess nuclear weapons of its own but 
stores functional nuclear weapons on its territory. A Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) is an 
area that bans the use, development, or deployment of nuclear weapons.  A nuclear umbrella 3
refers to the protection that a country allegedly gains through an alliance with a nuclear weapons 
state. This project focuses on the new Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, also known 
as the Nuclear Ban Treaty (NBT), which opened for signing on September 20, 2017.  
 
Hypothesis 
The question that this paper seeks to answer is: What explains the positions of EU 
countries concerning support for or opposition to the prohibition of nuclear weapons under the 
Nuclear Ban Treaty? Based on an analysis of each country’s allegiance commitments, nuclear 
arsenals, national security concerns, and interpretations of treaty language, this paper 
hypothesizes that competing identities are the source of discrepancy in attitude towards the NBT. 
Specifically, conflicting policies and expectations challenge EU members of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO), which give them a unique role on the world stage. Through a 
constructivist understanding, social constructs such as norms and discourse demonstrate 
significant influence on the decision-making processes of EU countries.  The timeline this paper 4
focuses on is post-Cold War, 1990 to present, as the end of the war marks a turning point in 
international attitude towards nuclear weapons and proliferation. This period includes the 
codification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and indefinite extension of the NPT, 
two significant pieces of legislation geared towards non-proliferation. This time period is useful 
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when evaluating the current situation, as the global community had appeared to find common 
ground on the issue but has since shown divergence regarding the NBT.  
 
Literature Review 
 Scholars such as Beatrice Heuser, Kristan Stoddart , Dong-Joon Jo, and Erik Gartzke  use 5 6
a realist approach to identify deterrence as a main variable of proliferation, a concept associated 
with a country’s resources and capabilities. Other scholars such as Robert Keohane, Lisa Martin , 7
and Neal G. Jesse  use a more liberalist approach to identify cooperation, verification, and the 8
role of institutions as key variables. Markedly, these scholars overlook the paramount role of 
identity and norms in the proliferation process. Jesse explores the components of a state’s 
identity and the impact that those components have on foreign policy, which is relevant to this 
analysis. This paper’s argument follows that of William C. Potter  who analyzes the impact of 9
the humanitarian-initiative movement (HIM) on the disarmament process through a 
constructivist lens, with a focus on the role of discourse. Constructivists seek to understand the 
process of how international norms evolve and play a role in the behavior of states.  10
Constructivism involves analyzing interactions between individuals and structures through 
methods such as discourse analysis to see how states shape identities and interests.  Potter found 11
that differing opinions on the issue had a significant impact on multilateral disarmament and 




 This comparative case study encompasses analyses of government policy statements and 
declassified documents, treaty documents, conference records, white papers, and public speeches 
made by political leaders at United Nations conferences. Initially, this research sought to identify 
patterns in orientation towards the NBT within the scope of EU members and NATO members. 
These patterns were then compared with support or lack thereof for the NPT, the CTBT, a 
potential Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), and NWFZs. Data collection presented four 
notable outliers: Austria, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Poland, due to strong orientation towards 
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the NBT and nuclear non-proliferation. The purpose of this research is to determine what 
variables were most influential in constructing these particularly conspicuous positions. 
Outliers 
 Austria and Ireland are two advocate outliers that have shown adamant support for the 
treaty and non-proliferation regime as a whole. Austria and Ireland were among the few states 
that voted in favor of the draft NBT, and while the majority of others abstained, the Netherlands 
was the only country from any region to vote against the draft. A fourth outlier is Poland, not 
because it has a dominant role in the implementation process, but because it has a unique history 
and a correspondingly unique course of action regarding nuclear proliferation, which warrants 
further analysis. These four countries are not the only EU states to have differing views on the 
NBT, but they are the most prominent and practical for comparison. This paper will only briefly 
mention the United Kingdom and France, as they are also outliers for obvious reasons, such as 
their status as NWS. 
Regional Anti-Proliferation Index 
 To gauge commitment to the non-proliferation agenda, the regional Anti-Proliferation 
Index measures involvement in the legal regime based on military expenditures, nuclear weapon 
arsenal size, support for the NPT, CTBT, Draft NBT, and official NBT, and presence at the 
United Nations Conference to Negotiate a Legally-Binding Instrument to Prohibit Nuclear 
Weapons, Leaning Towards their Total Elimination. A country will get one point (+1) if its 
military expenditures have consistently decreased since 1990, no points (0) if the percentage 
spent remains the same and lose points if it has increased overall (-1). A country will receive one 
point (+1) for decreasing its nuclear arsenal size, receive no points (0) for maintaining the same 
arsenal size, and lose one point for increasing its arsenal size (-1). If a country is a nuclear host 
state, meaning that it stores the nuclear weapons of other NWS on its territory, it will lose 0.5 
points (-0.5). Ratification of selected treaties receives one point (+1), followed by accessions and 
successions (+0.75 points), signatories (+0.5), non-signatories (0), and withdrawals (-1). 
Similarly, a vote for the NBT draft treaty receives one point (+1), abstentions receive no points 
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(0), and an opposition vote results in a loss of one point (-1). Regarding the 2017 United Nations 
Conference to Negotiate a Legally Binding Instrument to Prohibit Nuclear Weapons, Leading 
towards their Total Elimination, presence receives one point (+1) and absence receives no points 
(0). A country will be awarded extra points if it makes a statement at the conference (+0.5), sends 
more than the average number of representatives (+0.75), or holds a leadership position at the 
conference (+1), because these factors further exemplify noteworthy engagement.  
 The country that has the highest number of points is the most active in non-proliferation 
efforts based on the chosen variables. The following chart represents the point system: 
*Complete 2017 Military expenditure data is not yet available. 
Data comes from the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, the World Bank Group, the United 
Nations, and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. The average number of 
Trajectory of Military Expenditure 
1990-2016 (%GDP)* 
Overall decrease in spending    +1 
No change in spending overall    0 
Overall increase in spending     -1 
Nuclear Weapon Arsenal Size (1990-2017) 
Decrease in size +1 
No change in size 0 
Nuclear Host     -0.5 
Increase in size -1 
Support for NPT, CTBT, NBT 




No signature 0 
Withdrawal -1 
Draft NBT Vote 
Vote for +1 
Did not vote      0 
Vote against -1 
Presence and Involvement in 2017 Conference 
Present +1 
Absent  0 
BONUS POINTS: 
Statement +0.5 
More than average # of reps +0.75 
Leadership position +1 
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representatives present per country at the 2017 NBT Conference is five, determined by dividing 
the total number of representatives present at the conference by the total number of countries 
present. 
Anti-Proliferation Index (API): Europe 
1990-2017 
Country                           Score  Rank 
Expenditur
e (MX)
Arsenal NPT CTBT N B T 
Draft
NBT Presence
Austria +1 0 +1 +1 +1 +0.5 +2.75 7.25 1
Belgium +1 -0.5 +1 +1 0 0 0 2.5 9*
Bulgaria +1 0 +1 +1 0 0 0 3 7*
Croatia +1 0 +0.75 +1 0 0 0 2.75 8*
Cyprus +1 0 +0.75 +1 +1 0 +1 4.75 4
C z e c h 
Republic
+1 0 +0.75 +1 0 0 2.75 8*
Denmark +1 0 +1 +1 0 0 0 3 7*
Estonia -1 0 +0.75 +1 0 0 0 0.75 11*
Finland 0 0 +1 +1 0 0 0 2 10
France +1 +1 +0.75 +1 0 0 0 3.75 5
Germany +1 -0.5 +1 +1 0 0 0 2.5 9*
Greece +1 0 +1 +1 0 0 0 3 7*
Hungary +1 0 +1 +1 0 0 0 3 7*
Ireland +1 0 +1 +1 +1 +0.5 +1.75 6.25 2*
Italy +1 -0.5 +1 +1 0 0 0 3.5 6*
Latvia -1 0 +0.75 +1 0 0 0 2.5 9*
Lithuania -1 0 +0.75 +1 0 0 0 0.75 11*
Luxembour
g
+1 0 +1 +1 0 0 0 3 7*
Malta +1 0 +1 +1 +1 0 +1 5 3
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*Tie 
**The United Kingdom received +0.5 for Nuclear Arsenal Size because although it has been 
decreasing its stockpile, there was a period of inconsistency from 1998 to 2005, during which its 
nuclear warhead supply increased. 
The API for Europe shows Austria ranked first with the maximum number of points possible 
(7.25). This means that Austria is the most active in terms of non-proliferation efforts. Following 
closely behind are Ireland and Sweden, tied for second at 6.25 points. The Netherlands is ranked 
exactly fifth, which means that it is relatively active since no ties exist before sixth place. 
Poland’s activity is average, as it tied with seven other countries for seventh place. This index is 
applicable to all regions of the world.          12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Background 
Ireland 
 Since 1958, Ireland has led the disarmament movement with its “Irish Resolutions” 
proposal, also known as the foundation for the NPT.  As the “first signatory and leading voice” 21
of the NPT, Ireland continues to present itself as a strong advocate for disarmament, having been 
one of the few countries to sign the NBT document immediately on September 20, 2017. 
Netherland
s
+1 -0.5 +1 +1 -1 0 +2.25 3.75 5
Poland +1 0 +1 +1 0 0 0 3 7*
Portugal +1 0 +0.75 +1 0 0 0 2.75 8*
Romania +1 0 +1 +1 0 0 0 3 7*
Slovakia +1 0 +0.75 +1 0 0 0 2.75 8*
Slovenia +1 0 +0.75 +1 0 0 0 2.75 8*
Sweden +1 0 +1 +1 +1 0 +2.25 6.25 2*





+1 +1 0 0 0 3.5 6*
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Ireland has a long history of British rule and now assumes an international position of 
neutrality . Its decision to become neutral came from its resistance to the asymmetrical power 22
between itself and Britain.  Irish-British relations have improved post-colonization, but the Irish 23
government continues to work to establish and maintain an identity that is completely 
independent of the United Kingdom. Ireland joined the EU in 1973 and is not a member of 
NATO but participates in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, which allows it to work with 
the alliance without having to become a member.  24
 Ireland does not possess any nuclear weapons, nor does it utilize nuclear energy, which is 
largely due to government’s ability to afford the long-term financial commitment. The Irish 
government is already struggling to meet its renewable energy requirement under the European 
Union’s 2020 goals, but according to former Energy Minister Alex White, Ireland is unlikely to 
utilize nuclear energy in the future.  This is because the Radiological Protection Institute of 25
Ireland places firm regulations on the use of nuclear energy through the Radiological Protection 
Act of 1991, and because the potential environmental and safety concerns of nuclear energy 
worry the public.   26 27
 Ireland’s defense spending is the lowest in the region, which raises concern regarding 
national security.  Ireland is ill prepared to defend itself unless Irish leaders believe that the 28
CFSP as a formidable means of defense. It cannot even rely on deterrence because it lacks the 
minimum capability necessary to have a credible defense system.  A 2015 White Paper released 29
by the government stated that “maintaining military capabilities...is too expensive”.  For such 30
reasons Ireland is particularly vulnerable to conventional attacks, invasions, or wars, let alone 
nuclear incidents. Ireland’s overall vulnerability explains its aggressive nonproliferation stance.  
  
Austria 
Austria has also presented itself as a main force behind nuclear disarmament. Along with 
Ireland, it was one of the five EU countries that voted in favor of the draft version of the NBT on 
July 7, 2017 and signed the official document on September 23, 2017. Austria has been a 
supporter of non-proliferation efforts since the implementation of the NPT, and according to 
William C. Potter, was “the most critical voice in the Focus Group discussions” during the 2015 
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NPT Review conference. As made possible by Article VII of the NPT, Austria has independently 
declared itself a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone.  This makes it the only NWFZ in Europe.  In 31 32
2014 at the Vienna Conference, Austria issued a Pledge that addresses the humanitarian 
consequences of nuclear weapons, known as the Humanitarian (or Austrian) Pledge.  The 33
purpose was to launch negotiations on a nuclear prohibition treaty and force nations to 
acknowledge the need to bridge the ‘legal gap’ that refers to the several possible interpretations 
of international law on nuclear weapons.  34
Austria constructed its first nuclear energy plant in 1972 and planned to construct two 
additional plants until the government began to experience backlash from the community. The 
public had initially appeared to support the move to nuclear energy but protesting gradually 
increased, which led to a referendum in 1978 in which the votes against nuclear power won by 
slightly more than fifty percent.  Notably, Austrians voted against nuclear power even before the 35
nuclear Chernobyl disaster of 1986, which effectively deterred many nations from using nuclear 
energy. Following this, the Austrian Parliament passed a law called ‘Atomsperrgesetz’, which 
translates to the “Atom banning law”, prohibiting the use of nuclear energy in Austria.  36
Although Austria has the capability of using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, it has opted 
against doing so. 
It seems as though Austria’s history of occupations and invasions has shaped its 
nonproliferation perspective. Constant adversity stifled the ability of the country and its citizens 
to create an identity until it regained sovereignty post-WWII. Austria joined the EU in 1995 and 
has not become a member of NATO. Like Ireland, it collaborates with the alliance through the 
PfP program. Austria identifies the PfP program as a necessary partnership for effective 
involvement in military efforts within the CFSP, since there is a large overlap of member states.  37
Austria recognizes the EU and NATO as partners but nonetheless assumes neutrality on an 
international stage. 
Austria’s defense system is minimal and efforts to maintain military preparedness have 
decreased according to officials, but Parliament reassures that “the better Austria is integrated 
into the international security architecture, the more efficiently will it be able to safeguard its 
security interests and peace policy objectives”.  Austria attaches its national security concerns to 38
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those of the EU, and emphasizes how defense strategies internationally have shifted from 
deterrence to cooperation.  Parliament explains that this shift occurred after the Cold War, which 39
triggered a transformation in European security policy, as the world order evolved to include 
numerous global players as well as less transparency and predictability.  Because of this, Austria 40
has begun to rely more on cooperation with other international actors as a defense strategy rather 
than fortifying its own military. 
Netherlands 
 At the United Nations Conference to Negotiate a Legally Binding Instrument to Prohibit 
Nuclear Weapons, Leading Towards their Total Elimination, the Netherlands was the only 
country from any region to vote against the draft of the NBT. The Netherlands did not sign the 
Humanitarian Pledge, but it is a founder of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative 
(NPDI) and a member of the Conference on Disarmament (CD), along with Austria and Ireland. 
The NPDI is a group of states that seek to strengthen the non-proliferation regime by achieving 
goals such as increasing transparency within the nuclear regime and promoting key legal 
instruments that safeguard nuclear activity.  Poland and Germany are the only other EU-NPDI 41
members. Notably, the Netherlands is the chair of the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 NPT 
Review Conference.  The Netherlands has a strong national identity, exemplified by its role as a 42
founding member of both the European Union and NATO. 
 The Netherlands has one functioning nuclear reactor with at least one more unit proposed 
for the future.  Dutch interest in nuclear energy began to decay after substantial natural gas 43
reserves were discovered, and even more so after the Chernobyl nuclear disaster.  Consequently, 44
Dutch parliament decided to phase out the Borssele reactor but reversed the decision in 2005 due 
to “legal difficulties”, which refers to trouble implementing the decision.  When the 45
environmental and economic benefits of nuclear energy became clear, sentiment began to favor 
nuclear energy, and the government remains open to constructing new plants for the purpose of 
cutting carbon dioxide emissions in accordance with the European sustainable energy goals.   46
In 1970, the Netherlands became part of a joint nuclear fuel company with Germany and 
the United Kingdom, which now also involves the United States.  U.S.-Netherlands relations are 47
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long-standing through NATO and the stockpiling of American nuclear weapons on Dutch 
territory. Much this stockpiling happened in the beginning of the 1960s and involved the United 
Kingdom as well.  Geographically, presence in the Netherlands has been advantageous for the 48
United States, especially with robust Dutch naval forces as a resource. American anti-submarine 
warfare (ASW) units were also stored on UK territory for Dutch use, but the use of these 
weapons has always been up to the leaders of the United States and the United Kingdom.  The 49
American nuclear arsenal in the Netherlands has considerably decreased since the end of the 
Cold War, but it still “currently deploys an estimated 10-20 nuclear B61 bombs in underground 
vaults inside 11 aircraft carriers at Volkel Air Base”.  On its own, the Netherlands has a 50
formidable military defense system, spending an average of 1.201 percent on defense in 2016.  51
Military upkeep in the Netherlands is necessary as the country represents a crucial strategic 
position for the United States. While the Netherlands may not have any enemies of its own, it 
must be prepared to assist or cooperate with its American ally if necessary, especially if Dutch 
leaders seek American protection.  
Poland 
Poland did not vote on the NBT draft treaty, voted against the convening of a 2017 
Conference to Negotiate a Legally Binding Instrument to Prohibit Nuclear Weapons, Leading 
towards their Total Elimination, and has not signed the Humanitarian Pledge.  Its history has 52
been contentious, which is recognized by its political leaders, “Poland fought for and regained 
independence between 1918 and 1921, only to lose it again in 1939-1945, and to once again 
reclaim it in 1989-1991”.  Poland joined NATO in 1999 and became an EU member in 2004. 53
Poland gets most of its energy from coal and gas. In order to coincide with the EU 
climate policy, Polish leaders continue to search for a way to minimize reliance on harmful 
consumption methods.  Much of its gas supply comes from Russia, a country that the Polish 54
government seeks to rely less on in general.  Consequently, Poland has looked to nuclear energy 55
as an effective and environmentally friendly substitution. Poland has 23 active reactors, 6 under 
construction, and 9 planned.  Since 2009, Poland has been cooperating with France on matters 56
of nuclear plant development, research, and construction.  57
!  of !13 30
13
Dorner: The Nuclear Ban Treaty: Advocates, Neutrals, and Opponents in the
Published by Dartmouth Digital Commons, 2018
The Polish government has also been working to establish cross-border energy 
transmission systems. Already partially connected with Sweden through a subsea line, Poland 
has formulated an agreement with Ukraine in 2015 regarding a future project as well.  Polish 58
leaders have also devised a plan with Finland and Sweden to synchronize energy transmissions 
by 2025 through the Baltic Energy Market Interconnector Plan (BEMIP) and are pursuing 
another big project that will establish a link with Lithuania.  59
Within its 2017-2021-policy framework, Poland seeks to enhance the credibility and 
potential of its allies and bolster its own defense capabilities.  The country is working towards 60
meeting the defense spending quota set by NATO. Poland regards the EU and NATO as “vital” to 
its security and claims to have already become increasingly more secure because of these 
alliances.  While Poland does not host nuclear weapons on its territory, it has agreed to host a 61
United States missile defense system, much to Moscow’s disgruntlement. There has been 
discussion between the United States and Poland regarding threats to Poland’s security and its 
corresponding areas of weakness.  The agreement is a clear strategic advantage to both sides: 62
The United States recognizes that this assistance will strengthen 
Poland’s contributions to the NATO Alliance and facilitate strategic 
cooperation between the United States and Poland. Poland 
acknowledges and appreciates the important assistance provided by 
the United States in the past to Polish military modernization efforts. 
The United States intends to provide substantial assistance to support 
Poland’s military modernization efforts in the future” (United States 
Department of State 2008). 
The Role of Language, Identity, and Norms 
Language and the ‘Legal Gap’ 
The aftermath of implementation is one area of disagreement among advocates and 
opponents of the NBT. Advocates view the NBT as a mechanism that will complement the NPT 
and strengthen the non-proliferation regime, while opponents believe the opposite. Leaders from 
!  of !14 30
14
Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Economics and World Affairs, Vol. 1 [2018], Iss. 1, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.dartmouth.edu/dujpew/vol1/iss1/5
countries such as the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, and the United States argue that 
the imperfections of the treaty will jeopardize the NPT and non-proliferation process. The nature 
of the language used in the treaty and during negotiations has a big role in creating this 
discrepancy. 
Ireland stubbornly underscores the necessity of implementation.  As early as 1957 63
Foreign Minister Frank Aiken regarded the need for nuclear disarmament as “urgent”.  In March 64
2017, Irish Ambassador Patricia O’Brien stressed the need for everyone to “reject the premise 
that they [nuclear weapons] can ever be used again under any circumstances” due to the 
catastrophic affects.  At the 72nd UNGA meeting in October 2017, Mr. George-Whilhelm 65
Gallhofer of Austria used similar language to that of Foreign Minister Aiken when he expressed 
that disarmament and the implementation of the CTBT are both ‘urgent’, and again when he 
highlighted the need for the “total elimination of nuclear weapons”.  Gallhofer’s language was 66
extreme, especially when he stated that the international system appears to be “balancing at the 
edge of an abyss”.  Gallhofer and his Austrian counterparts are actively encouraging other 67
countries to sign the NBT and get it into force “as soon as possible”.  68
Austria’s geographical location at a nuclear crossroad may be the underlying push behind 
its intense discourse. Likewise, Ireland’s adjacency to the United Kingdom, a NWS, could 
potentially make it feel like a target of other NWS states such as Russia. Contrarily, countries 
like the Netherlands argue that there should be no rush in the process. The hurry or hesitancy that 
leaders exhibit regarding implementation is a result of how individual leaders have interpreted 
the grey area, or legal gap, that exists in international law on nuclear weapons.  
Political leader Hans Dijkstal of the Netherlands and Patricia O’Brien commented on this 
“legal gap”, which refers to the fact that international law does not specifically forbid the use of 
nuclear weapons. The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) sent an inquiry to the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) asking if the use of nuclear weapons was legal under 
international law. Hans Dijkstal responded to this ICJ case, expressing his belief that the court 
should refrain from giving an opinion. He explained that a decision deeming nuclear weapons 
illegal would endanger the integrity of the NPT, as would a decision that deemed them legal.  69
He describes the case as a “recipe for competition and fragmentation”.   70
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If the court had decided that nuclear weapons were unlawful, then that would have 
applied to all circumstances.  If the court had decided that they were lawful, the permitted 71
circumstances would have been unclear, a matter that the ICJ would have not been required to 
explain further.  Dijkstal presented several examples of ambiguity related to possession, side 72
effects, small nuclear weapons, humanitarian law, and victim suffering.  He also argued that 73
outlawing nuclear weapons would lead to more instability by putting NWS and nuclear host 
states in an awkward position, as they would suddenly possess large arsenals of illegal 
weapons.  Essentially either outcome of the case would have carried significant and potentially 74
disastrous weight in the process of disarmament. 
Participants have noted the vulnerability in the language that can lead to different 
responses. For example, the Dutch identified Article 1 of the NBT as incompatible with NATO 
obligations, and submitted a temporality clause that adjusted the wording so that it could better 
match the obligations of NATO member states. This effort did not succeed though, because it did 
not align with the views of many other participants. Failure to find common ground in language 
inevitably infringes on the ability of countries to reach a unified position, resulting in a blocked 
consensus. The debate on language persisted during verbal negotiations, especially since the 
NBT introduced new discourse that eliminated the prospect of interpretation, such as the 
declaration that nuclear weapons are to “never be used again under any circumstances,” which 
presented a problem for NATO and others who rely on nuclear weapons for security. The new 
regulations posed by the NBT would be favorable for the political leaders who are ready to make 
a considerable change, but for NATO countries particularly, the definitive language renders the 
legislation incompatible with their views and results in a rejection of the treaty. Yet, the 
opportunity for each state to have its own interpretation has led to many failed negotiation 
attempts as well. 
Wording and interpretation of discourse are thus responsible for part of the division 
within the EU. Negotiation is inevitably difficult when implications are unclear. Agreement on 
language is a key component of cohesion, as the difference between one word and another can be 
the difference between a vote for or against the entire agreement. Those who have rejected the 
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NBT are rejecting the language of the treaty, not the idea. This does not explain all oppositions, 
but it explains one important point of contention among many countries involved in the process. 
Identity and Decision-Making 
National identity is at the core of decision-making. Irish and Austrian leaders identify 
themselves as neutral on an international stage but must utilize their voices to push disarmament 
because otherwise their land and their people are highly vulnerable to nuclear threats due to their 
lack of arsenals, dangerously low military spending, and hypothetical absence of military allies. 
These problems are products of their perception of neutrality.  
The Austrian government has instead adopted a pro-humanitarian approach to the issue, 
possibly to show sympathy to possible victims of nuclear warfare, because it can historically 
relate to war-related violence. Out of respect for the integrity of its people’s identity, culture, and 
traditions, the government is also careful to respect their voices, a concept validated by the 
Humanitarian Pledge, and by the outlaw of all things nuclear following public outcry. Each 
nation’s diverse past has led to the formation of diverse identities, and these two countries in 
particular have committed to the fight against nuclear weapons based on the beliefs and 
suspicions they have formed over time. The Nuclear Ban Treaty would provide the utmost 
credible means of security for these ‘non-allied’ states. 
With this, even those who are not neutral face adversity in this area. The NBT clearly 
contradicts some of NATO’s fundamental principles, as NATO relies on nuclear deterrence and 
collective defense. Thus, NATO leaders seek to persuade NNWS members to adhere to its beliefs 
and act in accordance with the alliance: “We strongly encourage you [NATO members] to vote 
‘no’ on any vote at the UN first committee on starting negotiations for a nuclear ban treaty”.   75
Therefore, Poland’s vote against negotiations and the Netherlands’ vote against the NBT 
are not surprising. The Netherlands identifies closely with NATO as an original member and is 
acting in support of what the alliance wants. Although the Dutch government has expressed 
support for non-proliferation and has taken on leadership roles within the movement as the chair 
of the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 NPT Review Conference, member of the CD, and co-
founder of the NPDI, it is nonetheless slowing down the disarmament process. Ultimately, all of 
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these decisions are linked with NATO. The Dutch overtly expressed loyalty to NATO in their 
explanation of vote on the NBT, which asserted that the Netherlands could not accept the NBT or 
“any instrument that is incompatible with NATO obligations”.  76
The Polish government appears to be constantly concerned with the nation’s sovereignty 
and security. In Polish foreign policy documents, Polish leaders often point out the threat that 
Russia poses. Especially after Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, Poland’s history of 
occupation and Russia’s proximity have reasonably intensified apprehension among Polish 
leaders. The first sentence of Polish foreign policy strategy reads, “Poland’s security and 
environment has deteriorated considerably as a result of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the 
Russian-provoked conflict in eastern Ukraine”.  Long ago Polish leaders recognized the 77
vulnerability of the country’s geographic position and have now made a clear decision to be 
proactive in acknowledging the threat. The government has called for the strengthening of 
military forces in the EU’s Eastern flank to ensure the capabilities of NATO, because it fears 
reliving its history of Russian occupation. This likewise means that the government is willing to 
do whatever necessary to ensure the alliances reliability, even if that means storing U.S. missiles 
on its land.  Polish leaders have further expressed that American military involvement in Europe 78
is imperative for the security of the region and “is key to maintaining NATO’s collective defence 
and deterrence capabilities”.  79
 Thus, inconsistencies between Polish claims and actions make sense. Polish officials are 
advocates of non-proliferation for other NNWS, but out of fear for Poland’s national security, 
leaders are attempting to balance advocacy paradoxically with increased defense cooperation 
with the United States and NATO.  80
The Evolution of Norms: Neutrality and Nuclear Weapons 
Neutrality 
The norm of neutrality is evolving and becoming increasingly difficult to uphold. A 
country that deems itself neutral forfeits military assistance from other countries, which can be 
daunting during a time of instability in the international community. This is why ‘neutral’ 
countries like Ireland and Austria inadvertently show partiality to one alliance or another, in this 
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case towards the West through collaboration with NATO. The idea of being neutral seems 
favorable until a government is fully responsible for defending its territory: “it is the role of the 
government to be prepared to act alone in its own defense until the United Nations can secure 
international peace and security”.  In one way, this is beneficial to governments that fear 81
domination by the more powerful countries in an alliance, but on the other hand, it leaves a 
nation vulnerable. Aside from whatever protection the CFSP claims to offer, Ireland and Austria 
would be responsible for protecting themselves against nuclear weapons in the event of war, 
against which they have no nuclear weapons or anything nearly as powerful with which to 
retaliate. In a sense, non-NATO membership could serve as a defense strategy itself, but the 
reliability of that strategy would depend on whether or not countries like Russia would target 
NATO members directly or instead target less powerful, neighboring states. Therefore, it is 
understandable that the leaders of these countries would seek alternative security in some 
compromised form. Although neither the Irish government nor the Austrian government believe 
that their countries will be involved in violence soon, neither wants to wait for something to 
happen, especially if they lack a promised umbrella.  82
As global relations pressure states that adhere to this norm, a shift in its meaning occurs. 
Some scholars such as Neal G. Jesse refer to neutral states as ‘non-allied’ instead of neutral, 
because the nature of the international system makes it incredibly difficult to abstain from 
military alliances. Austria is essentially non-allied despite its attempt to remain neutral because 
in reality, its United Nations membership makes it clear that complete neutrality is not possible 
based on a legal view of UN obligations.  So-called neutral states, like Ireland and Austria, 83
openly value their relationship with NATO and seek to maintain an amicable relationship with 
the alliance to increase the likelihood of inclusion in its defense.  84
Even just being an EU member poses challenges to the claim of neutrality, as Europe has 
begun to create common defense policies of its own. Although the claim is that countries like 
Ireland can benefit from the military assistance of the EU without having to change neutral 
status, the slight orientation is still evident and worthy of suspicion.  The Amsterdam Treaty 85
states: 
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The policy of the Union in accordance with this Article shall not 
prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of 
certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain 
Member States, which see their common defence realized in the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), under the North Atlantic Treaty 
and be compatible with the common security and defence policy 
established within that framework” (European Communities 1997). 
Ultimately, the union recognizes the potential need for member states to compromise its 
commitment due to its obligations to NATO but regards it as a chance for the two alliances to 
work in unison. So, while EU member countries are not required to change their neutral status, it 
does not mean that they do not utilize the support of the EU’s partners, one of which is clearly 
NATO. Austrian Parliament recognizes this advantage and admits that security within the region 
is dependent on EU and NATO relations, and that the success of the CSFP depends on this 
partnership.  86
Nuclear Weapons 
Upon finalization of the NPT, the international nuclear ‘norm’ was that NNWS would 
forfeit the opportunity to obtain nuclear weapons, if NWS would eventually decrease stockpiles 
and dispose of nuclear weapons. Many are questioning this ‘norm’ in 2017. Norm pioneers like 
Ireland and Austria are fighting incredibly hard to make a new universal ‘norm’: no nuclear 
weapons, at all, ever. The desired shift here is from deterrence to cooperation. Many NNWS are 
promoting this norm while NWS are resisting it. As an alliance that relies on deterrence as a 
defense strategy, NATO continues to contest this norm and persuades all of its members to do the 
same. 
In this way, it is possible to address realist and liberalist claims. Should countries be 
prioritizing deterrence, as realists would suggest, Ireland and Austria would not have cut military 
spending to practically nothing. The Austrian Parliament at one point actually mentioned the 
decreasing relevance of the deterrence principle, “There has been a paradigm shift in security 
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policy in Europe. This process, which started with the end of the Cold War (1989), has initiated a 
transition from thinking in terms of military balance and deterrence to an understanding of 
comprehensive and co-operative security”.  Furthermore, another Austrian official stated, “…it 87
is urgent that we finally move on from the Cold War concept of mutual assured destruction as the 
illusionary warrant for the security of ourselves, our children and grandchildren”.  88
Yet deterrence remains a key component of NATO policy formations, “[NATO will] 
maintain an appropriate mix of conventional, nuclear, and missile defense forces…to bolster 
deterrence as a core element of our collective defense and contribute to the indivisible security of 
the alliance”.  However, it is not necessarily a determinant of the decisions made by EU 89
countries regarding the NBT. EU countries that do not express direct support for the NBT are 
voting based primarily on how those countries identify with NATO, not its deterrence policy 
specifically. The NBT conflicts with this deterrence principle, but explanations of opposing votes 
frame the violation of NATO member obligations. While several non-NATO EU states covertly 
rely on the alliance’s deterrence, such as Ireland and Austria, there is no barrier limiting their 
ability to support a piece of legislation that clearly violates such rules because they are simply 
not parties to the alliance. 
The intimidation of a British nuclear umbrella could be reason behind Ireland’s rejection 
of realist views. Ireland’s lack of military and lack of alliances leave it extremely vulnerable in 
an intensifying international climate, “…lacking a credible defense, Ireland pursues diplomatic 
relations as a way to assert itself”.  This idea emphasizes cooperation to some extent, but the 90
framework of the debate would likely be on verification if cooperation were the main issue. 
While the Netherlands addresses verification as an issue of the NBT in its explanation of vote, 
Austria and Sweden also address this factor yet still voted in favor of implementing the NBT. 
While the debate can incorporate problems of verification, one cannot give full credit to this 
liberal ideal because the issue itself arises primarily due to the severity of the regulations in the 
NBT that would necessitate the verification. 
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Other Key Players 
The United Kingdom and France 
The United Kingdom and France are two more EU countries that did not vote on the NBT 
draft. They support non-proliferation and have signed the NPT and CTBT and have shown 
support for a potential Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) but rejected the ban because of 
their status as NWS and corresponding reliance on nuclear weapons for security. They identify 
the importance of the NPT and their commitment to eventual disarmament through that specific 
piece of legislation, rather than the new ban treaty, which they believe would undermine 
international peace and security.  Furthermore, the United Kingdom and France released a joint 91
statement with the United States that firmly declares their unrelenting disapproval of the ban, 
“We do not intend to sign, ratify, or ever become party to it [the NBT]”.  The United Kingdom 92
and France are hugely important in the disarmament process and hold two of the strongest 
positions within the EU, but their positions are not comparable to those of other EU members as 
they are the only NWS in Europe. 
Sweden 
  Sweden falls into the same category as Ireland and Austria. It has established itself as a 
neutral territory, voted in favor of the NBT, has upheld significant presence at conferences and 
negotiations, and participates in the PfP program. Sweden has significantly cut defense spending 
since 1990 from 2.39% of GDP to 1.042% and assumes a similar position on defense and non-
proliferation as Ireland.  Its leaders provided a statement in response to the draft NBT that 93
parallels the beliefs and language of those of Ireland and Austria. In its explanation of its 
affirmative vote, the speaker noted that the ban treaty did not meet its expectations but it 
nonetheless decided to support it due to the “unprecedentedly limited time at our disposal”.  The 94
Swedish government assumes the position of a norm pioneer as it firmly believes that the “new 
norm against the use and possession of nuclear weapons will be strengthened by this treaty”.  It 95
has expressed some disappointment with the treaty, though, because the NPT is not clearly 
recognized as the cornerstone for disarmament, there are concerns regarding verification, and 
because there are issues with the language such as in Article 18, which suggests that obligations 
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of the NPT and CTBT could potentially appear to be reduced under the NBT.  William C. Potter 96
further refers to Sweden’s participation in 2015 NPT Rev Con and how it emerged as one of the 
“most ardent advocates…for strong language on the humanitarian impact [of nuclear 
weapons]”.  97
Germany 
 Germany is a member of NATO, a member of the NPDI, and has been involved in FMCT 
negotiations. Following WWII, the opportunity to develop nuclear weapons was limited in 
Germany, and consequently it does not have any of its own.  Like the Netherlands, and like 98
many other EU-NATO members, the German government shows support for non-proliferation 
but also shows commitment to its NATO allies. German leaders have previously pledged to 
never use nuclear weapons, yet it hosts at least 10-20 known U.S. tactical bombs and “is 
expected to extend the service life of its nuclear-capable PA-200 tornado through the 2020s”.  99
The German government does not participate adamantly in negotiations probably because of its 
conflicting perspectives: that of the government, which is inclined to comply with NATO, and 
that of the people, which demand acceptance of the NBT.  The German government ignored 100
this demand in its decision to abstain from negotiations.  101
Findings 
The cases of Ireland, Austria, and Sweden are applicable to other EU countries that 
identify as neutral. Because of the identity that these countries have formed, they are more 
inclined to push for a ban on nuclear weapons than are those who identify with NATO. Along 
with Ireland, Austria, and Sweden, Cyprus and Malta voted in favor of the NBT. These five 
countries were the only five out of the entire European Union to vote in favor of the treaty. 
Including Finland, these countries are also the only EU members that are not members of NATO. 
Aside from these five affirmative votes and the one negative vote from the Netherlands, all other 
EU countries abstained from voting on the treaty. Finland did not vote on the draft because it 
regards United States nuclear weapons as vital to its security, assuming its close collaboration 
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with the EU on defense.  However, Finland remains hesitant to join NATO partially due to its 102
geographic location, as it shares a border with Russia.  103
The Dutch have a tremendously close relationship with NATO and a long history of 
international leadership. These two aspects of the country’s identity almost oblige it to form a 
strong position against the NBT, unless it wants to forfeit one of its central characteristics. 
Essentially the Dutch government is trying to balance internal pressure from its citizens, who are 
increasingly showing opposition to the idea of nuclear weapons, with its NATO commitments.  104
These internal and external pressures are forcing the government to seek a solution. This case is 
nonetheless applicable to other EU NATO members, especially those who store nuclear weapons 
on their territory. This includes Belgium, Germany, and Italy, which are in the same position as 
the Netherlands, but do not have the same motivation to be deep-seated in the debate. These 
countries support nuclear disarmament but are unlikely to vote in favor of the proposed NBT not 
only due to their identities as NATO members but furthermore because of their status as nuclear 
hosts. Poland’s ability to advocate for nuclear non-proliferation is slightly more flexible than 
these states since it hosts U.S. missiles instead of nuclear weapons. The case of Poland is more 
comparable to the remainder of other EU countries that do not have unique status as nuclear 
hosts but hold questionable positions on the NBT, as seen in the RPI. 
The leaders of the Netherlands are negotiating on behalf of EU-NATO members, and 
trying to sell the idea that the international community is working towards disarmament, despite 
lack of support for the NBT. The Dutch are trying to reinforce that the means by which the 
international community can best achieve disarmament does not include the process proposed in 
the Nuclear Ban Treaty. A popular argument made by most opponents of the NBT is that the 
treaty will infringe on the progress that has occurred through agreements such as the NPT, and 
the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) between the United States and Russia. During a 
brief on the NBT, the German delegation also raised the point that Ireland and Austria are on the 
border of pushing negotiations too hard and argued that the momentum could antagonize 
important disarmament players and cause them to disengage from the initiative.  105
Ultimately, EU-NATO members are rejecting the proposed norm that will come with the 
NBT while non-NATO EU members attempt to persuade acceptance of the new norm through 
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acceptance of the treaty. Many countries recognize the necessity of NWS compliance in order for 
the new law to be successful, but it remains increasingly difficult to find common ground 
between supporters and oppositionists as many are in different situations that result in different 
fears and motivations. Consequently, the inclination of non-NATO EU countries to be preventive 
is so strong that they are unlikely to easily surrender to the demands of NATO.  106
Conclusion 
The habits and inclinations that countries develop over time are extremely powerful 
determinants of decision-making. The diverse histories of EU member countries have played a 
central role in the development of each country’s individual identity and corresponding policies. 
EU member states who are promoting the new norm are pushing for change guided by their past 
experiences, while those resisting norm evolutions are also doing so because of how they view 
their role in the world. Lack of EU cohesion is not concentrated on support or opposition for 
non-proliferation and disarmament, but rather on the approach to the issue. EU member states 
have not been able to reach consensus on the ban treaty primarily because the definitive language 
used in the legislation, that signifies the creation of a new nuclear norm, does not satisfy the 
different viewpoints that countries have based on their identities. Without the influence of 
determining factors such as language, norms, and identity, EU countries would likely have very 
similar outlooks on the issue. The presence of such factors is what makes agreement, 
cooperation, and coherence complicated. 
These findings suggest that disagreement over the NBT as it stands is inevitable. Key 
NWS have already decided that they will never sign the treaty, despite the strong efforts of others 
to implement it. Until international actors can find common ground regarding the NBT, which is 
unlikely to happen soon, the international community needs to refocus its disarmament efforts in 
order to continue making progress towards a nuclear-weapons-free world. Advocates and 
opponents of the NBT alike need to shift their attention back to the NPT as a fundamental 
building block for disarmament, push for the implementation of the CTBT, and continue 
negotiations on a possible FMCT, before any implementation of a nuclear ban can be further 
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considered. Stern advocates for elimination may not be fond of this prolonged process, but it 
may be the only way for disarmament to progress amidst disagreement. 
Austria and Ireland should shift their intense advocacy towards the implementation of the 
CTBT, which is less controversial and remains outstanding since it opened for signing in 1996. 
In order for the CTBT to enter into force, all remaining “Annex 2” states must sign and ratify the 
treaty, which amounts to only eight other states.  Additionally, Austria and Ireland can push for 107
more negotiations on a FMCT, which would aid disarmament efforts significantly if enacted. 
This would allow both advocates to continue making progress towards non-proliferation without 
unintentionally dismantling the entire process. With that, both countries should try to ease the 
pressure they are putting on other states to accept the NBT, at least temporarily, in order to avoid 
aggravating NWS and jeopardizing overall success. 
The Netherlands and Poland should likewise push for the CTBT and a potential FMCT if 
they wish to keep the disarmament process going as well. However, these countries, especially 
the Netherlands, should initiate negotiations with supporters of the NBT in order to review the 
treaty and adjust the language. This should be a priority for these countries if they truly wish for 
the nuclear ban to someday succeed. The Netherlands in particular needs to act as a mediator 
between advocates and opponents, and work closely with the United Kingdom and France to 
gain an understanding of what needs to happen in order for these countries to accept a ban treaty. 
Poland is right to remain wary of potential aggressors such as Russia, but Polish leaders should 
not retreat from non-proliferation efforts. Polish leaders can similarly push for the CTBT and 
FMCT yet still refrain from provoking its enemies or frustrating its allies. It is important, though, 
that while the fate of the NBT is unclear, Poland avoids bolstering its defense and external 
assistance to an extent that perturbs its NWS neighbor and former occupant. 
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